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Central Banks are often accused of being 
obsessed with inflation. This is untrue. If they are 
obsessed with anything, it is with fiscal policy. 
(Mervin King, Governor of Bank of England) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of the paper is to evaluate the robustness of the theory that claims 
for restrictive effects of expansionary fiscal policy. It shows that such so-
called “non-Keynesian effects” may arise as a consequence of a 
synchronous and opposite monetary policy intervention. The paper 
demonstrate this conclusion through a stylized model – supported by an 
empirical investigation on ECB and FED reaction functions - in which 
Central Banks take into account deficit spending as an element that 
generate inflation expectations. The econometric analysis shows also that 
the ECB reacts asymmetrically to deficit spending variations while the 
FED has a linear reaction to this indicator. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal policy, Monetary policy, Central Banks Policy 
strategies. 
JEL classification: E52, E58, E62, E63 
 
 
1.  The Background. 
 
Theoretical settings of fiscal policy have changed dramatically since early 90s in comparison with 
the previous decades. Previously public deficit was considered strictly as a tool for stabilization of 
aggregate demand and income; after then such an instrumental role has been more and more 
criticized. The final outcome of this theoretical reconsideration is a new conventional wisdom that 
connects counter-intuitive effects to public deficit spending.   
The aim of the paper is an evaluation of the theoretical robustness of such new orthodoxy that 
became a new ruling paradigm and a very popular conjecture in mainstream academy. New 
theoretical foundations appear in two mirror approaches, thought as equivalent at all: “Keynesian 
effects of non-Keynesian fiscal policy”, and “non-Keynesian effects of Keynesian fiscal policy”. 
The first one regards the hypothesis that a fiscal contraction could arise positive effects on 
production and income, a phenomenon now labelled as “Keynesian effects of non-Keynesian fiscal 
policy”; the second, usually thought similar to previous one, holds that an increase in public deficit 
spending may create negative quantity effects on production and income, according to a theory of 
“non-Keynesian effects of Keynesian fiscal policy”. 
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The two phenomena are, from a theoretical point of view, quite different, but, irrespective of 
superficial equivalence, the common starting point of such conventional wisdom is the failure of 
“old-fashioned” Keynesian belief in a positive fiscal multiplier. 
The struggle against this model is not a recent phenomenon. Opponents to basic keynesism appear 
since the first, pioneer exposition of a positive fiscal multiplier carried on by Keynes in the late 20’s 
through argumentations included in the Treasury View1. This disagreement reappears in the late 60’s 
with Friedman monetarist approach to natural rate of unemployment approach, it continues with the 
“crowding-out” argumentations arriving to Rational Expectations Models and Ricardian 
equivalence. 
It must be stressed that all these positions theorized low or null fiscal multiplier whereas new 
positions, in the early 90’s, assume negative fiscal multipliers, that is Non-Keynesian effects of 
Keynesian fiscal policies and vice versa. 
The germinal work of the  new approach was provided by Giavazzi and Pagano in 19902, arising a 
flow of countless contributions still uninterrupted, with new researches by old pioneers, supported 
now by new scholars.3 
Such contributions have to be analysed very carefully because they constitute a constant benchmark 
for all the successive studies on negative effects of fiscal policy and because new conventional 
positions of policymakers, particularly within Euro Area, refer, constantly and explicitly, to the 
Giavazzi and Pagano position. 
Our paper offers a different view to interpretative hypotheses of Non-Keynesian View (hereafter 
NKV), and we shall try to argue that:    
i. Keynesian effects are produced by a peculiar (well known in the 80’s) policy mix 
determined by an essential role played by monetary and exchange rate policies and not 
by “pure non-Keynesian fiscal policies”; 
ii. Possible success of “intrinsic pure non-Keynesian fiscal policies” depends on very severe 
and unreal analytical conditions; 
iii. European policy makers, and namely European Central Bank and European Committee, 
have been embracing such a theoretical approach without deepening all its limits. 
In this paper we try to develop this alternative approach using the following structure. Section 2 
analyzes the main theoretical foundations of Non-Keynesian View passing to, in section 3  to a 
review of the empirical literature of the  NKV approach. In section 4 we comment the framework 
conditions that usually help NK policies to reach counter-intuitive results. In section 5 a model 
containing the fiscal policy transmission mechanisms is presented in its structural relations. Through 
this model we derive the validity condition of NKV outcomes  and show  the relevance of monetary 
policy cooperation in order to reach these results. In section 6 we try to check empirically the 
consistency of our conjectures, particularly the relevance of monetary framework. Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The Tale  of a  Fiscal Counter-Revolution. 
 
During the 80’s the growing budget deficit and the very high public debt triggered a deep revision of 
the direct relation between public expenditure and growth. Academics agreed on the fact that there 
was the need to consolidate public finances because of the instability effects of real monetary and 
financial markets. The institutional claims coming from ongoing EMU gave a further push to this 
stream of studies. 
But, even if economists agreed on negative effects on growth of increasing fiscal imbalances, they, 
at same time, feared the negative results of fiscal restrictions. Therefore, when economists started to 
                                                 
1 Peden  G.C., 1984 
2 Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990. 
3 Giavazzi et al, 1999, 2000 and 2005. 
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observe successful fiscal consolidations – i.e. the contemporary presence of budget deficits 
reductions and income growth – they concluded that there were no doubts left on what economic 
policy had to do.  
The work considered as the most relevant for the subject matter was Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). It 
was a very successful econometric analysis in which the authors observed a consumption increase 
during fiscal restriction. It paved the way to the general conclusion – or, as they call it, to the non-
conventional wisdom - that retrenchments can be expansionary. This is what we call the non-
Keynesian view. 
Following this first publication, in a new article Giavazzi-Pagano (1995), they extended the results 
of fiscal consolidations to fiscal expansions4. They found that “fiscal policy changes can have non-
Keynesian effects if  they are sufficiently large and persistent”5. These results were further 
consolidated in Giavazzi Pagano Iappelli (1999) Giavazzi Pagano Iappelli (2000) e Giavazzi Pagano 
Iappelli, (2005), where they estimated the saving function instead of the consumption one. 
The theoretical foundations of their empirical results are based on a composition of Modigliani life-
cycle theory or Friedman permanent income theory and Ricardian-equivalence theory as in Barro 
(1974). If consumers a) have rational expectation and b) are not liquidity constrained tend to smooth 
the consumption – or saving - through time, following the expected flow of actualized disposable 
income. If therefore during fiscal retrenchment we observe an increase of consumption, it is the 
proof that private individuals have revised their permanent income upward and that – they state – the 
cause of this revision is the consolidation of public finances. 
Investigating more deeply their works,  a progressive consolidation of their non Keynesian view 
comes out. In Giavazzi Pagano (1990) the positive effects on consumption were observable because 
of “two simultaneous policy shocks: a fall in current disposable income, due to the increase in 
current taxes, and a wealth effect due to an unanticipated fall in nominal and real interest rates”6. 
They admit that the expansionary effect is not the result of a pure fiscal restriction but of its indirect 
effect on interest rates. In Giavazzi Pagano (1995) the observed negative effect on income of fiscal 
expansions is caused - in their view - by the downward revision of private individuals permanent 
income. It is considered certain the conclusion that the reduction of permanent income is univocally 
determined by the expansionary fiscal policy. 
But the stream of studies was so successful that they continue to extend and reinforce their 
conclusions through testing the saving function. In Giavazzi-Pagano-Iappelli (1999), Giavazzi 
Pagano-Iappelli (2000) e Giavazzi-Pagano-Iappelli-Benedetti, (2005), which differ from each other 
for the width of the sample considered. Econometric analysis allows them to conclude that: 
a) national saving non linearly increases or reduces when there is a fiscal consolidation and 
contraction respectively;  
b) that the non linearity arises because of the fact that fiscal episodes are not sufficiently large and 
persistent as predicted by the theory of permanent income;  
c) that the fiscal consolidations are more effective than fiscal expansions;  
d) variation of net taxes are more effective then variations of public consumption; 
e) the level of public debt is not, finally, a good predictor of non Keynesian effects. 
In a few words, while at the beginning the core of their NKV was the fiscal and monetary policy 
mix, through the years, it has become the  pure fiscal policy. The opposite effect of fiscal 
interventions is assured by a kind of “super-Barro effect” according to which the fiscal contraction 
or expansion does not have a null outcome, but a more than proportional autonomous negative effect 
on permanent income7. 
                                                 
4 Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal restrictions are very often estimated, while the contrary has not find a wide consensus 
in the empirical literature.  
5 Giavazzi Pagano (1995) abstract. The first  but not the second italic is our. 
6 Givazzi Pagano (1990), p. 14 
7 Finite horizon models suggest that an increase in net taxes should raise national saving (>0), whereas an increase in 
government consumption should reduce it . In the benchmark infinite horizon model with lump-sum taxes, taxes have no 
effect on national saving this is the Ricardian equivalence proposition. Also, in the infinite horizon model, for a given 
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This last position have limits that cannot be easily overcome: non Keynesian effects of Keynesian 
policies cannot derive simply from the relation between fiscal stance and saving or consumption8. In 
order to make them verified it is necessary to suppose – beside the hypotheses of rational 
expectations and no-liquidity constrain that the fiscal policy intervention: a) has to be  unanticipated; 
otherwise individuals would have already discounted the movement of disposable income and b) has 
positive effects on the real value of private assets or c)  is financed through debt because this predicts 
a further tax movement in order to pay interests on public bonds or d) causes interest rates 
movements in the same direction. In all these cases the fiscal policy cause an opposite movement of 
income through the channels of the consolidated theory – in one word through the rate of interest 
real or nominal, actual or expected 
The literature coming after empirically investigated on the non-Keynesian results of fiscal policies, 
in particular fiscal restrictions. Results were found to operate through the general effects on reserve 
wage and competitiveness (Alesina an Perotti 1995 and 1997), but only if fiscal consolidations were 
conducted without raising taxes or cutting public investments (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1997, 
Alesina and Ardagna 1998). The effects on the other components of aggregate demand were 
investigated also, especially the investment channel9. The literature considered to be relevant the 
initial level of debt, the persistency of reduction and the dynamic of interest rates (Blanchard and 
Perotti 1999, and Ardagna 2004). Differently from the Giavazzi- Pagano-Jappelli contributions this 
“non-Keynesian literature” relies on the indirect effects of the reduction or expansion of public 
spending on supply and demand without identifying an autonomous capacity of increasing or 
reducing permanent income. 
It is therefore an empirical re-proposition of an old debate about the crowding-out effects of 
expansionary fiscal policies. 
 
 
 
3.  The Empirical Literature of a  Fiscal Counter-Revolution. 
 
The empirical literature about NK effects of fiscal policy can be divided in three main categories 
based on different approaches. The first approach is based on simulations of macroeconomic models. 
The second approach uses cross-section and panel analysis in order to  analyze the relationships 
between fiscal policy and output. These contributions estimate  the reaction of  consumption  interest 
rates, exchange rates and investments to fiscal policies. The third approach is the VAR one.  
 
 
3.1 Behavioural  Equations Estimates   
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
path of pre-tax income, Y, government consumption does not affect national saving either. [] But in the regression 
they find that “t he coefficient of T/Y* is positive and statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level in each 
regression. [And ] the coefficient of G/Y* is negative and also statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level in 
both regressions. [Therefore] contrary to the predictions of infinite horizon models with non-distortionary taxes, the fall 
in private consumption does not fully compensate the increase in government consumption, thereby reducing national 
saving Giavazzi, Pagano Jappelli (2005) p.15. 
8 This circumstance is recognized by the same authors: “ Expansionary fiscal contractions can be explained by the effects 
of fiscal policy on the market value of wealth and on expectations about future taxes. A fiscal contraction often reduces 
interest rates, raising the market value of stocks, bonds and real estate, thus stimulating aggregate demand. It can also 
drastically change people’s view of the future and therefore the estimate of their human capital. For instance, in a high-
debt country a fiscal correction may prevent a financial crisis, thus improving confidence and increasing consumption 
and investment” Gavazzi, Pagano Jappelli (1998) p.1, (1999) p.2, (2000) p. 2. 
9 Perotti (2004b) “In fact, government investment appears to crowd out private investment, specially in dwelling and 
inmachinery and equipment. ” 
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Beginning with Giavazzi and  Pagano (1990) a large number of empirical  studies has reached the 
conclusion that contractionary (expansionary) fiscal policies may have positive (negative) effects on 
households  consumption.  These studies analyze  fiscal consolidations episodes through the effects 
on behavioural functions. All studies try to isolate the channels through which the fiscal contractions 
may have positive effects on output. This literature has focused mainly on consumption, although 
there are some studies analyzing the effects of fiscal policy on investments and interest rates.   
These studies are based on some strong theoretical assumptions. Most households make inter-
temporal optimizations in order to decide their consumption level, and  they have no-liquidity 
constraints. 
The strongest evidence of expansionary fiscal contractions are in  Giavazzi and Pagano (1990); the 
authors find that Denmark in 1983-86 and Ireland in 1987-89 are bright examples on non-Keynesian 
effects of fiscal policies. 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1995) try to extend their previous results  and to evaluate whether the 
coefficients change in different situations. Non-Keynesian effects seem to rise in adjustment periods. 
The authors find that the effects on private consumption of taxes is 0.05, the coefficient for transfers 
is -0.07, while the effect of public consumption is -0.02. In normal times the behaviour of 
consumption seems to be purely Keynesian.  Thus, it seems difficult to conclude that such small 
coefficients in the consumption reaction to fiscal policies could result in expansionary fiscal 
contractions.      
Giavazzi et al (2000) conclude that large fiscal policies have stronger effects10. They analyze 
consumption, estimating a saving behavioural function and making a distinction between bad and 
good times. The results do not seem to give evidence for non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policies 
even in bad times. 
Hjelm (2002) tries to extend the conclusion drawn for Ireland and Denmark in Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1990), while Kamps (2001) tries to do the same for the results in Giavazzi et al (2000). 
Kamps (2001) does not find NK effects, except in three cases with country-specific consumption 
equations. Nevertheless, the author admits that a richer specification is needed in order to make the 
results less fragile.   
Hjelm (2002), analyzes a panel of 19 countries spanning the period 1970-97. The estimation of  the 
share of  consumers that are credit constrained shows low levels, ranging from 0.1 to 0.14. 
Surprisingly, the impact of fiscal policy on consumption is not negative, and sometimes barely 
positive.  
It seems that this kind of analysis has some limits that prevent it from being completely convincing. 
Since most of these studies focus on some episodes of fiscal contractions, it seems that a sample 
selection bias may arise. Hemming et al (2002) suggest that handpicking specific country-cases, 
could provide stronger results with respect to a larger cross-section  of countries.  
Measurement errors can also occur since most of these papers use fiscal deficits as a basis for 
assessing fiscal policy change. They do not take into account fiscal policies with strong output 
effects but with small budgetary impact. 
A richer specification, could have given different results. Other variables could explain the 
relationship between fiscal policy and the economic activity (e.g. inflation, exchange rates, 
unemployment rates, wealth effect, and interest rates). 
Another problem, is  the absence of a variable (or a set of variables) controlling for the interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy. Ahrend et al (2006) assess how and in what circumstances fiscal 
consolidations are affected by the choices of monetary policy. Surprisingly, there are not so many 
papers studying the effects of monetary policy and/or exchange rate variations on a consolidation 
policy. Fiscal consolidation can be assisted by a shift in monetary stance since a decrease in the 
interest rates can compensate the depressive effect of fiscal contraction on the demand. On the other 
hand, monetary expansion can reduce interest  payments on public debt.  
                                                 
10 The same conclusion is reached by Gavazzi and Pagano (1995) and Cour et al (1996). 
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Ahrend et al (2006) conclude that the reaction of the central bank can be very important in 
determining the results of a fiscal consolidation. These results seem to have  a very strong theoretical 
implication. Fiscal plans have to be implemented in the central bank projections and the response of 
the central bank should influence the result of a fiscal policy. 
 
 
3.2 Macroeconomic Model Simulations  
 
Estimates from simulations of macroeconomic models do not give unique results about fiscal 
multipliers. Nevertheless, given its technical complexity, this approach permits to specify some 
aspects that are not taken into account with other methodologies. One of these concerns the 
specification of the reaction in terms of monetary policy. Nevertheless, this literature has some 
common features,  one of them is that most of  the analysis show that short-term multipliers are 
positive.  
Richardson (1998) uses the INTERLINK model in order to analyze some  short and long run  
macroeconomic aspects. The author investigates the response in terms of output from  an increase in 
public expenditure. The experiment evidences   positive multipliers that decrease over time. 
Moreover, different assumptions about the reactions in terms of monetary policy show different 
results. Nevertheless, the incidence of different monetary regimes seems to have relevance only in 
the short-run (Dalsgaard et al, 2001 and IMF, 1996). 
Another clear evidence  is that the range of multipliers estimated is narrower in the long-run 
(McKibbin , 1996 and Bryant et al, 1993). As evidenced in Roeger e in’t Velt (2002) and Barrel et al 
(2002), the multipliers constantly reduce over time and reach zero in the long-run. Hunt and Laxton 
(2002), and Dalsgaard et al (2001) find negative long-run multipliers for the same group of countries 
using INTERLINK and MULTIMOD models. 
Many macro models simulations show that in the short-run spending changes multipliers are bigger   
than tax changes. A MULTIMOD model simulation  in IMF (1996) shows that  for the USA the  
spending multiplier is 1.1 and the  tax multiplier is 0.7. 
It seems  clear  that the specification of the models and their assumptions are crucial in determining 
different results.  Wallis (2003) makes a comparison of the QUEST, NiGEM, MULTIMOD and 
AWM models, and all the short-run  multipliers are positive.   
The main difference between the models seems to be the specification of the consumption function.  
In AWM the consumption function is based on  present income .  In the simulations of NIGEM 
model the consumption is not function of temporary income changes and consumers are completely 
backward looking.  MULTIMOD models consider liquidity constraints, and these levels change with 
different specifications of the model. 
Concluding, there is evidence that public expenditure cuts reduce output. Nevertheless, the estimates 
of future incomes and how they are used for the forecasts, the estimates of consumption, the  
predictability level of  the economy by the agents are all points that sometimes are not stressed and 
explained in an exhaustive way. 
 
 
3.3 VAR Approach  Literature  
 
The time series-based empirical literature studying the effects of fiscal policy shocks uses mainly 
VAR models to represent the economy. The main differences among all these studies concern the 
VAR specification and the shocks identification strategies. 
Fatas and Mihov (2001 a, b) solve the identification problem using the recursive approach  (based on 
the Cholesky decomposition) introduced by Sims (1980). Fatas and Mihov  (2001 a) show that an 
increase in government expenditure is accompanied by an increase in private consumption and  
employment. Although the results are  in line with the Keynesian theory, the spending multiplier 
values are small.  
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002) show that an increase in public expenditure is followed by an increase 
in output, and that an increase in taxes is followed by a reduction in the output. Moreover,  long run 
multiplier still remains positive and close to unity.  
Several papers have used the Blanchard and Perotti (2002)  approach. Kuttner and Posen (2002) find 
a spending multiplier of 2.0 and a tax multiplier of 2.5 for Japan. Perotti (2002) analyzes a sample 
containing five countries, he finds out that impact and peak spending multipliers are always positive, 
although the peaks are reached in different periods ranging from 1 quarter (Germany) to 17 ( UK and 
Canada). The evidence about the sign of long-run multipliers is more mixed, depending on the sub-
samples considered. Nevertheless, this article suffers of some statistical weakness since some series 
are non-stationary and the trend correction could have been not sufficient to correct it.    
Mountford and Uhlig (2002) use a different approach imposing sign restrictions directly on the 
impulse-response functions.  They analyze USA data and they find that shocks to government 
expenditure are substitute for private investment rather than private consumption, since the latter is 
not reduced after an increase in government spending. Moreover, they argue that the fiscal policy 
reacts to cycles but does not to monetary policy. 
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) introduce  the fiscal dummy variable approach, also known as the 
narrative approach, in order  to analyze the effects of large military spending in the USA. Their idea 
is to consider  defense spending as a proxy for government expenditure. They conclude that 
consumption falls after an increase in military spending while the increase in GDP is not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, other fiscal shocks can occur around the same time, polluting the 
identification of the military expenditure shock. 
As already evidenced, all these papers differ each other in the VAR specification  and in the 
identification of the fiscal shock. It can be argued that the different results of such studies can be due 
to the specification and identification choices. Caldara and Kamps (2006) test whether such 
differences can explain the different results. All the implemented approaches  agree in showing a 
positive reaction of GDP to a positive government shock. They conclude that, with an appropriate 
VAR specification, the recursive and Blanchard-Perotti identification schemes have only minor 
differences in their impulse-response functions. 
VAR literature shows that there is a positive relationship between government expenditure and 
output and that the multiplier is not negative even in the long run. The results about the relationship 
between government expenditure and consumption are more controversial. Nevertheless, even in 
papers where consumption decreases after a positive shock in public expenditure the fiscal multiplier 
is positive. Thus, concluding from a negative relationship between consumption and fiscal policy 
that the latter has negative effects on output, could not be correct.   
 
 
Apart form theoretical robustness of contributions, as well as their shortcomings,  NKV setting 
shows the  following features: 
 
i) it aims at undermining the positive value of Keynesian fiscal multiplier; 
ii) Ricardian Equivalence Approach becomes a practical tool to propose radical   
departures in  policy making:  A fiscal retrenchment can not be further considered as a cause 
of recession; 
iii) the model key variable is private consumption (or saving).  Keynesian effects of non-
keynesian fiscal policies are supposed to arise through private consumption variations, 
whereas in Keynesian approach the adjustment burden is carried on by investment. 
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iv) By a single step, NKV liquefies  arguments of dispute on Keynesian fiscal policies, 
even those pertaining the struggle, in the late 20s, between Keynes and the so called 
“Treasury View”11. 
NKV approach  benefited of a large academic and “policy” acceptance, hard to be understood by a 
pure theoretically point of view.  
Doubtful economists were few; surely Blinder (2004), Fitoussi (2002, 2004 and 2005), Solow (2005) 
and Krugmann (2005), partly Wyplosz (2005 and 2006)and no one in younger scholars. 
The results was a huge effort of brains and econometrics technicalities  aimed at  strengthening  the 
empirical consistency of NKV approach, never considering its theoretical coherence. 
 
 
4. Ceteris are not Always Paribus. 
 
As well as major shortcoming of IS-LM approach were founded in neglect of  public budget 
constraint and, hence, of interdependence between fiscal and monetary policy, NKV lacks of 
considering monetary effects of fiscal stance variations. The Central Bank, following a fiscal shock, 
can decide,  three different behaviours: a neutral feedback, when the Central Bank maintains  a 
conduct in determining its instrumental variable and intermediate targets independent from fiscal 
policy; an antagonist approach, when it operates on its instrumental variables aiming at frustrating 
decisions engaged by fiscal authority); a cooperative stance when monetary policy cooperates to 
achieve targets of public deficit variations (Allsopp and Vines 2005, Allsopp 2002). 
The monetary policy instrument for a central bank is the interest rate (Romer 2000 and 2006). It can 
be assessed without considering the definition of its intermediate and final targets. The interest rate  
is determined by the reaction function of the central bank. Thus, it follows that: 
i. a complete evaluation of fiscal policy effects that are assumed by NKV  should consider 
those associated with those determined through interest rate variations decided by the central 
bank in presence of a new fiscal policy setting, 
ii. Considering the interest rate would permit a distinction between pure (in the sense of 
policies without any monetary feedback) or policies applied with  a co-operative or 
antagonistic central bank behaviour; 
iii  The validity of NKV (that is the presence of keynesian effects with non-keynesian fiscal 
policies, or non-Keynesian effects through Keynesian fiscal policies) depends on the 
assumption of  the presence of pure fiscal policies. Otherwise we should start from a  monetary 
and fiscal policy mix. 
Analyzing the first paper of NKV (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990), it seems clear that episodes of fiscal 
policy retrenchements that should have caused non-Keynesian effects are policy mix instead,  in 
which  monetary and currency policies have played a crucial role: “…reviewing the key facts about 
the Danish and Irish experiments, highlighting the importance of the monetary and exchange rate 
policies that accompanied the fiscal stabilisation”(p.6); “cuts in spending and tax increases were 
accompanied ….by complementary monetary and exchange rate policies”(p.7); “the removal of 
controls on capital inflows by Danish authorities was equivalent to a positive demand 
shock”(p.27);..we also found that part of the expansionary effects of the fiscal contractions analyzed 
here must be attributed to the concomitant monetary disinflation….it is remarkable that in both our 
cases of “expansionary contractions” the shift in fiscal and exchange rate policy was preceded by a 
sizable devaluation”(P.28)12. 
                                                 
11 Then Keynes proposed a public works program financed by government bonds in the electoral program of Lloyd 
George. The Treasury, a British institution “more than a ministry” (Peden), disagreed, supposing negative effects 
because of dis-saving created by public sector and for the attributes of inefficiency of government expenditure 
12 Italics added. 
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This approach doesn’t change in successive works: fiscal retrenchments are always  analysed for 
their apparent features, as if ceteris were paribus and not regarding other phenomena, such as central 
bank reaction on interest and exchange rates.  
But if ceteris are not paribus it is significant to examine the effects of fiscal policies on monetary 
policy, hence on “the reaction function of central bank” (hereafter CBRF)13. 
Actually, cases examined by GP, throughout all their contributions, are canonical examples of 
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, where interest and exchange rates are affected by 
public deficit variations. 
The notion that the reaction function of monetary authorities depends on fiscal policy, too (Allsopp 
and Vines, 2000) and its stance will be, more or less, enhanced by antagonistic or co-operative 
monetary policy reaction function (Taylor, 1996), is not new in literature. Debate on “optimal policy 
mix”, i.e. on effectiveness of fiscal contractions harmonized with benign monetary policy goes back 
in the 70’s and 80’s. The debate in US on optimal combination of monetary and fiscal policy in ‘70 
and ’80 is fundamental to understand that the theory of economic policy is richer than the debate that 
originated the NKV (Okun 1972, Carlson 1982, Tobin 1982,Blinder 1985)14, a conscious debate 
would be wrong to label such a case as “pure fiscal policy” or “non-Keynesian effect”.  
Understanding  interdependence of policies and reaction of Central Bank to public deficit variations 
involves analysis of monetary authorities Loss Function, that is the behavioural equation underlying 
the reduced form equation of Taylor Rule, because a rigorous Taylor Rule must be derived 
explicating Central Bank model of the economy and its weights to possible deviations from selected 
targets. We therefore assume that Reaction Function of Central Bank becomes a cornerstone to 
analyse effects (Keynesian or non-Keynesian) of fiscal policies. 
The starting point is the awareness that, empirically, fiscal policy results are strictly influenced by 
monetary policy behaviour. Ahrend et al (2006) investigate in such relationship considering episodes 
of fiscal consolidation in 24 OECD countries15..The main findings, for our aims, can be summarized 
as follows: 
i. Consolidation is more likely to be pursued if, ceteris paribus, it is assisted by an easing 
monetary policy, especially in the early stage of the policy. Moreover it seems to be likely to 
be successful if the monetary policy reacts more than what predicted by a Taylor rule; 
 
ii. Consolidation has higher probability to succeed when interest rates are falling. Interest rate 
variable does not affect that a consolidation period is started, but declining nominal and real 
short-term interest rates are associated with a higher likelihood that the adjustment is 
pursued, and with a greater success. The most convincing explanation for this result is that 
falling interest rates can encourage the continuation of consolidation, because the interest rate 
variable is picking up a reaction of monetary authorities. 
More generally, monetary authorities seem to adopt asymmetric behaviour when fiscal stance 
changes, increasing or lowering public deficit amount16. 
A fiscal retrenchment is, usually, encouraged by the central bank: in such a case non-keynesian 
fiscal policy is “helped” by interest and exchange rate policies that arise Keynesian effects: “If the 
central bank continues to follow its previous interest rate policy in the face of decline in the long-run 
real interest rate, then it will set an interest rate which is too high; this will have the effect of 
reducing demand in the economy.(Taylor, 1995). More:”..To the extent that fiscal plans are expected 
to be implemented, they can normally be expected to be factored into central banks’ macroeconomic 
projections.” (Ahrend et al. 2006). On the opposite, a fiscal expansion is feared by monetary 
                                                 
13 Meyer (2000), explicitly stressed the effects of public surplus on the formulation and conduct of monetary policy 
connection. 
14 “ To achieve a solid recovery, we need a easier monetary policy combined with a tighter fiscal policy. (Tobin, 1982). 
15 An episode of fiscal consolidation is identified as starting when CAPB increases of 1% of GDP in no more than two 
years. Short term interest rates are used as a proxy for monetary stance (Ahrend et al., 2006). 
16 Marvin King, Governor of the Bank of England is completely aware of  the relevance on fiscal stance on Central 
Banker behaviour. See King (2005 and 2007) 
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authorities: exchange rate appreciation and increased interest rate can frustrate fiscal Keynesian 
policy: “The fiscal authority attempts to lower unemployment by rising the deficit; this is countered 
as monetary authority raises interest rates to fight inflation; and so forth. At the end of this struggle, 
because the two parties pursue different objectives, the surplus is the big loser” (Nordhaus, 1996). 
The key variable to produce asymmetries in the central banks reaction functions, and particularly for 
European Central Bank is given by the central role that inflation and inflation expectations play in 
determining monetary authority setting interest rates. Fiscal policies consistent with a downgrading 
of inflation expectations determine a co-operative stance by Central Bank, an increase of public 
deficit perceived as inconsistent with the stability of inflation expectations is worried and potentially 
fought by monetary authorities. Starting from such evaluation we will present, in the next section, a 
simplified model of income determination, taking into account NKV discussed assumptions on 
“super-Barro effects” of public retrenchment on consumption function, the relevance of monetary 
policy decisions on interest and exchange rates, variables affected by an peculiar reaction function, 
asymmetrically influenced by assumed consequences of public deficit movements on inflation 
expectations (Surico, 2003).  
 
 
5. A Naïve Representation. 
 
It is possible now to introduce a simple model of income determination, moving from theoretical 
evaluations carried on by NKV, augmented with inclusions we consider crucial: changes of fiscal 
stance proceed necessarily with interest rate variations produced, through its reaction function, by 
effects that monetary authorities think public deficit will cause on market inflation expectations. 
Our model, therefore, is built up according some key assumptions: the NKV theory of relation 
between fiscal policy, permanent income and consumption; the supposed effect of public deficit on 
inflation expectations; the existence of a monetary policy reaction function careful to inflation 
expectations alterations.  
We show intentionally a simple exercise of comparative statics, aimed at stressing main structural 
equations of model, coming back “to the Neolithic Age of Structural Model” (Nordhaus, 1996)17. 
 
 
1 2Y= C + I + D +D  +NX                                                                                               (4.1) 
θ θ+ −0 1C = c (1 ) PY c Y                                                                                                     (4.2) 
αI = - R                                                                                                                              (4.3) 
γ= −P 2Y  B+ D                                                                                                                  (4.4) 
−0 1NX= n E nY                                                                                                                 (4.5)                              
βπ δ+eR= Y                                                                                                                      (4.6) 
π ν= + +e 1 2
n nA D D                                                                                                            (4.7) 
ξE= - R                                                                                                                                (4.8) 
 
 
 
Equilibrium income is represented in equation (4.1); the only exception respect to manual treatment 
is given by division of public deficit in two different components: 1D , a transitory component that 
is not thought as a component of fiscal stance and 2D , perceived as a permanent value of fiscal 
stance. Consumption function, in equation (4.2), embodies alternative scenarios: a traditional 
Keynesian element, 0c Y , whereby consumption depends on current income and NKV, 1 Pc Y , 
                                                 
17 Dynamic complication (and/or functions smoothing) should not modify main results.  
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whereby consumption depends on permanent income. Value of θ  determines social behaviour 
regards private consumption: if 1 θ = , a strict Keynesian approach holds; with = 0θ , consumption 
depends, at all, on permanent income and, therefore, a NKV scenario rule; if 0 1θ≺ ≺ , then private 
consumers decide, in the very short run, both on disposable and permanent income. Investment 
depends, as in equation (4.3), on interest rate, while equation (4.4) considers the flow of permanent 
income given by usual factors of “life-cycle” hypothesis , B , and the “super-Barro” component 
derived from expected permanent reduction in fiscal stance, 2D . The wealth variation is a condition 
determined through a subjective parameter, γ . Net exports depends, as in equation (4.5), from 
exchange rate and disposable income18. Equations (4.6)-(4.7)-(4.8) have to be analyzed together: 
Both components of public deficit, 1D  and 2D , affect, in addition to an exogenous element A , 
inflation expectations, eπ , according to Eq. 7. The general form of influence of 1D  and 2D , is 
included through generic exponents value, n , that, in case of odd values allow us to suppose a non-
linear influence of public deficit on inflation expectations. Inflation expectations, along with a proxy 
of output gap, impact on interest rate, through central bank reaction function19(hereafter cbrf), that, 
in the very short run, is the key variable for assessing exchange rate, as  we assume in eq.8. The 
non-linearity assumption between deficit and inflation expectations, and, thus, between deficit and 
cbrf will result crucial in discussing NKV. 
Resolving for Eq.(4.1), the value of equilibrium income is: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 2
1 0
1 11 1 1
1 11
n n n nY D n D D D n D c D
k k
Bc A n
k k
βα ξ βα ξ γ ϑ
ϑ βν α ξ
− − − − = − − + − − + − + 
+ − − +      
                   (4.9) 
where 1
k
is the usual multiplier of autonomous aggregate demand: 
0 1 0
1 1
k 1 ( )c n nϑ δ α ξ= − + + +                                                                                              (4.10)  
                                                                                 
Let us consider k  deeply. 
First components, 0 11 c nϑ− + , compare as well as in the Keynesian fashion, keeping in mind the 
significance of ϑ .  A new, different role is played by CBRF, included in 0( )nδ α ξ+ : if income 
raises there is a balancing effect of interest rate reaction function of the central bank on investment 
expenditure (αδ ) and through the exchange rate ( 0n ξδ ). From an analytical point of view the term 
0( )nα ξ δ+ could be thought as a “negative accelerator” of the Central Bank. 
As a first step, we can discuss the effects of fiscal policy with assumptions of NKV and without the 
working of CBRF. It means the assumption of a fixed interest rate, 
_
R R= . 
Now equilibrium income is:  
ϑ γ α ξ
ϑ
= − − − + + +  
− + 1 2 0 1 20 1
1
(1 ) ( ) ( )
1
Y c B D n R D D
c n
                                (4.11) 
Further, if all public deficit is judged as long-lasting and consumption depends completely on 
permanent income, that is if: 
1 0 ; 0D ϑ= =  
income value is: 
                                                 
18 It should be necessary, from a strictly theoretical point of view, to include flow of permanent income, PY , as an 
independent variable affecting NX , in addition to Y . Bur results should remain unchanged.  
19 Appendix I derives a Central Bank Reaction Function consistent with a structural Loss Function of monetary 
authority. 
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γ α ξ= + − − +  + 1 1 2 01
1
(1 ) ( )
1
Y c B c D n R
n
                                                               (4.12) 
From Eq.(4.12) counter-intuitive non-keynesian effects will have to be satisfied by the following 
inequality: 
 
γ−
= <
+
1
2 1
1
0
1
cdY
dD n
                                                                                                          (4.13) 
 
or if: 
1
1
c
γ >                                                                                                                                  (4.14) 
We remind that γ  is a parameter that links permanent public deficit to permanent income. If 1 1c = , 
inequality holds if 1γ > , that is if a permanent income variation involves a belief of a greater 
permanent income variation. If 1 1c < , inequality becomes much more doubtful. 
Including CBRF equilibrium income is equal to: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 2
1 0
1 11 1 1
1 11
n n n nY D n D D D n D c D
k k
Bc A n
k k
βα ξ βα ξ γ ϑ
ϑ βν α ξ
− − − − = − − + − − + − + 
+ − − +      
                 (4.15) 
A detailed list of fiscal multipliers with different significant assumptions on parameters value is 
included in Appendix II. Now, deriving Eq.(4.15) for D1 and D2, we obtain the total effect on income 
of public deficit, 1D  and 2D : 
β α ξ β α ξ γ θ− −− + − + −
+ = + +
1 1
0 1 0 2 1
1 2
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1)n nn n D n n D cdY dY
dD dD k k k
              (4.16) 
 
If consumption is completely dependent on permanent income, that is if ϑ = 0 , the total effect is 
equal to: 
 
 
β α ξ β α ξ γ− −− + − +
+ = + −
1 1
0 1 0 2 1
1 2
1 ( ) 1 ( )
' ' '
n nn n D n n D cdY dY
dD dD k k k
                          (4.17) 
 
where: 
αδ ξδ= + + +1 0
1 1
' 1k n n
                                                                                                (4.18) 
 
is a smaller multiplier of Eq.(4.10), due to the absence of 0c . 
If we assume a simple linear relation between public deficit and inflation expectations, with 
exponent of 1
nD  and 2
nD  equal to unity, the effect of deficit spending on income becomes 
 
β α ξ β α ξ γ θ− + − + −
+ = + +0 0 1
1 2
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1)n n cdY dY
dD dD k k k
                                   (4.19) 
 
Hence: 
 
 13
+ <
1 2
0
dY dY
dD dD
                                                                                                                (4.20) 
 
if 
 
{ }β α ξ θ γ− + − −   0 12 1 ( ) (1 ) 0n c  
 
or if  
 
β α ξ θ γ+ + −≺ 0 12 2 ( ) (1 )n c                                                                                      (4.21) 
 
 
 
Finally, inequality (4.21) holds greater the CBRF of monetary market, β , and exchange ξ  market, 
the non Keynesian component of consumption, 1(1 )c ϑ− , the “super-Ricardian” effect, γ . 
If we relax previous assumption of linearity between public deficit and inflation expectations, and we 
suppose non-linearity and asymmetry in effects of public deficit on inflation expectations, public 
deficit will switch in cubic functions, 3 31 2and DD . 
Now: 
 
β α ξ β α ξ γ θ− + − + −
+ = + +
2 2
0 1 0 2 1
1 2
1 3 ( ) 1 3 ( ) ( 1)n D n D cdY dY
dD dD k k k
                    (4.22) 
 
Reminding the key role of CBRF, and naming: 
 
0( )n RFβ α ξ+ =  
 
+ <
1 2
0
dY dY
dD dD
                                                                                                                (4.23) 
 
if 
 
β β θ γ− + − − − <2 21 2 11 3 ( ) 1 3 ( ) (1 ) 0RF D RF D c  
 
or if: 
 
β θ γ + + −  2 21 2 12 2 (3 ( )( ) (1 )RF D D c                                                                   (4.24) 
Asymmetrical effects of public deficit on inflation expectations increases, in comparison with the 
case of consolidation , probability of success of fiscal but it is worth mentioning that in such a case 
non linearity increases inequality probability because fiscal retrenchment is helped by an easing 
monetary policy that increases investment and net export. but this is not a case of pure fiscal policy.  
 
 
6. An Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section we check out the existence of a relationship between interest rate setting and a set of   
explanatory variables like inflation expectations, deficits, output gap, and other macroeconomic 
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factors that could affect monetary policy decisions. Our approach to modelling inflation expectations  
and monetary policy follows the idea, introduced by Ball (2000),  of the so called “nearly rational” 
approach. It assumes that,  in forming expectations (of any variables), economic agents optimally use 
all information in the past values of such a  variable. That is, we assume that expectations are based 
on optimal univariate forecasts. This "near rational" approach to expectations can explain why 
inflation appears so sluggish in past two decades. 
First, we consider the  basic relationship between interest rate setting and inflation expectations  with 
a  standard OLS methodology. Second, we use a Kalman filter approach in order to observe how the 
coefficients of each variable of the model  have changed over time. Finally we move our analysis to the 
study of linear-nonlinear relationships of an augmented Taylor rule where we test the assumptions 
made in the theoretical model of nonlinear reactions of the Central Bank to Deficit. Using monetary 
policy reaction functions, this section examines whether monetary policy responds to deficit in two 
central banks, namely, ECB and FED. 
 
 
6.1 Data Analysis 
 
The choice of the sample 1999-2006 for ECB and FED, using monthly observations, was essentially 
based on the need of analysing the behaviour of both monetary authorities after that the launch of the 
Euro currency took place. We describe, in appendix III,  the variables that will be used in our 
empirical analysis.  
  
 
 
6.2 Preliminary Evidences 
 
A first step of the analysis requires to test the relationship between a CBRF to inflation expectations. 
The assumption underlying this relationship is using HCS (Harmonised Consumer Survey) and 
MSCI (Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index) variables as indicators of inflation expectations. We 
postulate that they are positively correlated with the interest rate settled by central banks. We think 
there is a strong influence of inflation expectations on interest rate setting. Therefore, inflation 
expectations dynamic is crucial in determining monetary authority co-operative behaviour in case of 
fiscal consolidation. We use, for the ECB and FED, respectively Repurchase Rate and the Federal 
Funds Rate.  
Figures 1  and 2  present the patterns of the most representative economic variables and their trends 
in order to explain the different behaviours of the two Central Banks.  
Figures 1 and 2 give a preliminary evidence  that there is a relation between interest rate and inflation 
expectations. Moreover they evidence that it seems to be a relation between deficit and inflation 
expectations for the ECB, while for the FED it does not seem to exist. Thus, this raw data analysis 
suggests a deeper investigation in the relationships between interest rate and inflation expectations 
and its determinants.  
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Figure 1  EU Macroeconomic Variables and their Trends 
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Figure 2  US Macroeconomic Variables and their Trends 
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Therefore, we start our empirical analysis applying an OLS estimation with several lags of the 
dependent variable. However, it is well established in the literature that, because of the correlation of 
the lagged dependent variable to the transformed error term, standard fixed effects estimators of 
models with lagged dependent variables result in biased and inconsistent estimates unless the number 
of time periods are large (see Ridder & Wansbeek 1990, and Kiviet 1993). In this model, T = 92, 
hence the bias is negligible. 
We assume that central bank cooperation will depend on inflation expectations dynamics in the 
following way: 
 
t
n
i
e
ntijtR επβα ++= ∑
=
−
1
,            (6.2.1a) 
 
or   
 
( ) t
nt
n
i
e
ijtR εππβα +−+=
−
=
∑
1
,        (6.2.1b) 
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The results of the estimations of equations (6.2.1a) and (6.2.1b) for ECB and FED are presented in 
tables  1 and 2. The best measure is given by the relation between overnight rate and inflation gap, a 
quarter lagged. 
 
 
Tab. 1 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK INTEREST RATE REACTION TO INFLATION 
EXPECTATIONS. 
 REPURCHASE  RATE OVERNIGHT RATE 
  R_squared  R_squared 
e
tπ  0.078 
(11.939) 
0.618 0.077 
(12.293) 
0.61 
1
e
tπ −  0.079 
(12.208) 
0.629 0.078 
(11.59) 
0.61 
     
( )e
t
π π−  1.103 
(7.715) 
0.403 1.092 
(7.473) 
0.383 
( )
4
e
t
π π
−
−  1.347 
(8.549) 
0.601 1.347 
(10.825) 
0.577 
Source: ECB and European Commission 
 
 
Tab. 2 FED INTEREST RATE REACTION TO INFLATION EXPECTATIONS. 
 FED DISCOUNT  RATE FED FUND RATE 
  R_squared  R_squared 
e
tπ  0.078 
(4.554) 
0.20 0.11 
(6.492) 
0.30 
1
e
tπ −  0.081 
(4.509) 
0.20 0.118 
(6.545) 
0.32 
     
( )e
t
π π−  2.53 
(7.164) 
0.30 1.782 
(4.396) 
0.11 
( )
4
e
t
π π
−
−  2.49 
(6.808) 
0.25 1.826 
(4.541) 
0.11 
Source: FED and University of Michigan 
 
 
6.3  The Kalman Filter Methodology 
 
Then, we proceed to the identification of the coefficient of inflation expectations in eq. (6.2.1a) and 
(6.2.1b) in a more sophisticate way. In order to recover the parameter dynamics overtime, we 
estimate eq.  (6.2.1) employing the Kalman filter algorithm. Our second step refers to the selection of 
the best lagged variables using the time varying coefficients methodology.  Generally, the choice of 
explanatory variables depends on their statistical significance in the model. 
The Kalman Filter is a popular method which can be used to estimate unobserved variables, provided 
they appear as explanatory variables in a model that can be written in a “state space form”. Hence, 
the system must be written in a state space form with a measurement equation  in a matrix format:  
 
ttt XZy γ+= .   with    ),0(~ HNtγ                            (6.3.1a) 
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where  yt is the value of output gap, while Xt is a matrix of dimension (Txk) which includes all the 
explanatory variables plus a constant; the state vector Z, a (kx1) vector that contains all the slope 
coefficients, which are now varying through time and γt represents residuals with 
variance/covariance matrix H.. The transition equation in a matrix format:  
 
ttt vZTZ += −1.                                                                                             (6.3.1b)   
     
where vt ~ N (0,Q), and T is a vector of parameters. Such a model may be estimated by means of a 
Kalman filter.  
In principle, with this method all the parameters of the model may be estimated. In practice, there 
might be a trade-off between the number of parameters being estimated and the convergence of the 
likelihood function. More specifically, a key variable to the estimation of such models is the relative 
smoothness of the unobserved variable, which is governed by the relative size of the error variances 
in (6.3.1a)  and (6.3.1b). The higher the ratio of the variance of the transition to the measurement 
equation residuals, referred to as the “signal-to-noise ratio” (Q/H), the more explanatory power is 
given to the unobserved variable, and the better the fit of the measurement equation. In the limit, for 
very large values of Q, the unobserved variable may soak up all the residual variation in the 
measurement equation. Alternatively if Q is zero, then it will be estimated as a constant.  
In practice, most studies fix the signal-to-noise ratio so that the estimated unobserved variable is 
relatively smooth, with fluctuations which are judged to be reasonable from one period to another, 
which Gordon (1997) qualifies as “the [unobserved variable] can move around as much as it likes, 
subject to the qualification that sharp quarter-to-quarter zigzags are ruled out” 20. 
The Time Varying Methodology allows us to recover an unobservable factor that could affect the 
repo rate.  
We then apply a time varying parameters model as follows: 
 
itnitnitnitititititit bbbR γπππα +++++= −−−− ,2211 ....                                              (6.3.2)     
 
where i is the country, γit is an independent white noise and the coefficients are assumed to be 
random walks. This can be written in state space form where the observation equation is  
given by (3) above and the state equations are given by: 
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The model in equations (6.3.2) and (6.3.3) was initially estimated by maximum likelihood and the 
estimated variances are presented in table 3. Since we consider the time variation in parameters very 
important and its implication in defining a more reliable monetary policy, we need to test five 
hypotheses regarding the constancies of all or part of the parameters in Eq. (6.3.3).  Accordingly, we 
test five hypotheses: 
 
1. 0:
2
3
2
2
2
1
21
0 ==== νννν σσσσH   which implies that all parameters in eq. 3 are constant; 
                                                 
        20 See Bank of England (1998) for a survey. Some exceptions are Apel and Jansson (1998, 1999) for Sweden, Kichian (1999)    for 
Canada. These are countries specific studies, using quite sophisticated models. 
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2. 0: 220 =νσH  which implies a constant intercept but time variation in the  persistence 
parameters; 
3. 0: 21
3
0 =νσH  which implies a time-varying intercept but a constant inflation expectations  
parameter with one lag. 
4. 0: 22
4
0 =νσH  which implies a time-varying intercept but a constant inflation expectations  
parameter with two lags. 
5. 0: 250 =nH νσ  which implies a time-varying intercept but a constant  inflation expectations  
parameter with “n” lags. 
In order to test these hypotheses, we estimate the restricted versions of the model.  
The maximum number of lags used is n=5;  the hypotheses in 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5) can  be tested using 
likelihood ratio test (LR test). This test statistics follow a χ2 distribution with R degrees of freedom 
under the null hypothesis21. The results from these five tests  are given in table 4. 
Table 4  Variance of the parameters from Kalman filter of equations (3) and (4). 
Variance    USA EUM
σ2ν 3.958x10
-7
 6.875x10-6
σ2ν1 3.857x10
-6 4.269x10-7
σ2ν2 3.098x10
-6 7.546x10-6
σ2ν3 8.153x10
-6 6.172x10-7
σ2ν4 4.589x10
-7 5.771x10-7
σ2µ 3.547x10
-5 5.334x10-6 
 
Tab. 4  Likelihood Ratio Test (LR test) 
  USA EUM 
0: 23
2
2
2
1
21
0 ==== νννν σσσσH  )4(
2
LRχ
♦ 524.65** 451.77** 
0: 220 =νσH  )1(
2
LRχ  623.69** 479.54** 
0: 21
3
0 =νσH  )1(
2
LRχ  598.71** 396.98** 
0: 22
4
0 =νσH  )1(
2
LRχ  608.26** 413.36** 
0: 23
5
0 =νσH  )1(
2
LRχ  588.45** 389.58** 
0: 24
6
0 =νσH  )1(
2
LRχ  651.94** 405.86** 
Sample  1999:01/2006:10 1999:01/2006:10 
                                                 
21 A likelihood ratio test is calculated as the ratio of the likelihood of the sample data at the hypothesised value of β to the maximum 
of the likelihood function (i.e. evaluated at the MLE).  Hence we calculate  (for H0: β = β0 vs ≠0) 
LR = λ = L(β0)/L(βML)  with λ < 1.  If it is near to 1 we accept H0, if not we reject.  We now need the distribution of λ.  In some 
simple problems this can be worked out, but usually not.  Fortunately it can be shown that  -2 ln λ ~ χ2 in large samples, with q 
degrees of freedom where q is the number of restrictions in H0.    Now, large values of the test statistic (minus twice the log-
likelihood ratio) reject H0.    
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♦ )(2 RLRχ  are the test statistics from the likelihood ratio tests of whether the variances in the 
equations for the parameters of the model are zero. ** significant at the 1% level;  
 
 
First, it can be noted that  0: 23
2
2
2
1
21
0 ==== νννν σσσσH    is forcefully rejected for all countries and 
we conclude that some kinds of time-variation in coefficients seem to be important. The tests support 
also that the constant intercepts for all countries are time-varying. Rejecting 0:30H , 0:40H , 0:50H  and 
0:60H  it connotes that the 1
e
tπ − , 
e
t 2−π , 
e
t 3−π  and 
e
t 4−π  are not constant.  
In conclusion, null hypotheses are rejected for both countries and for all tests. Based on the above 
results, we conclude that the unrestricted models in equations  (6.3.2)    and (6.3.3) are preferred and 
we do not need to impose any restriction on them. 
Once estimated the dynamic coefficients of the unrestricted model in Eq. (6.3.3), we see the 
contribution of each inflation expectations (n) at time t in our interest rate setting as presented in 
table 5 and in figures 8-9 . 
In equation (6.3.2), the coefficient 'b', estimated using Kalman Filter approach against interest rates (EU 
Repurchase rate and US FED Fund rate), permits to evaluate the evolution of the ECB and FED 
responsiveness to inflation expectations.  The empirical results are summarized in table 5.           
Tab. 5 , The Kalman Transition Equation  1999-2006 
ECB Constant INFLEX (-4) 
Coefficient 
z-Statistict 
 
-0.215 
(-0.4562) 
1.0971** 
(5.212) 
FED Constant INFLEX (-1) 
Coefficient 
z-Statistic 
 
-4.981** 
 
(-4.863) 
0.7128** 
(4.304) 
*  significant at the 0.05 level; **  significant at the 0.01 level 
 
The maximum likelihood estimates show that the parameters of the time varying coefficients “b” are 
positive, as predicted by the model, and highly significant for both countries.   Figure 3 shows the 
behaviour of the coefficient 'bt',  for the  sample, February 1999 to December 2006.    
More precisely, as suggested by the analysis, the evolution of the ECB and FED responsiveness to 
inflation expectations reflects the behaviour postulated in the theoretical model and shown in figure 4. 
Observing   ECB behaviour, it increased steadily at the beginning of the sample and remain high till the 
end of 2004 when it inverted the trend, implying a tight monetary policy (high interest rate responses to 
high inflation expectations). The  Federal Reserve   increased its instrumental variable till the end of 
2001 when noticeably inverted its trend, implying a monetary policy more “output oriented” (low 
interest rate responses to high inflation expectations). 
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Fig. 3  Kalman Filter’s Coefficients and Trends 
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Fig. 4 EURO RED PARR and US Deficit and “b” Trends 
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Figure 4 suggests that our model  intuition of  non-linear relationship between inflation expectations 
and deficit could be indirectly confirmed by the Kalman Filter analysis. Thus, it seems that a non-
linear test for this relation and its analysis is needed.  
.     
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6.4 Non-linear Analysis  
 
The Smooth Transition Regression Model 
 
In order to explain and analyze the non-linear policy behaviour of a  central bank, a non-linear time 
series model is required. In this work we apply the smooth transition regression (STR) model. 
Despite the Markov-switching model, this methodology allows the regression coefficients to change 
smoothly from one regime to another. Moreover, in the STR model, the switching from one regime 
to another is endogenous, and gives opportunity for an economic explanation of the non-linear 
behaviour.  
 
The STR model is defined as follows 
 
( , , )t t t t tr z z G c s uφ θ γ′ ′= + +                                                                                               (6.4.1)              
 
and 
 
( ){ } 1( , , ) (1 exp )t tG c s s cγ γ −= + − −                                                                                   (6.4.2)  
 
Zt is a vector of explanatory variables. G(γ,c,st) is the transition function. G(γ,c,st) ∈  [0;1], and it is 
continuous in the threshold/transition variable st . st   is not necessary  contained in Zt. c is the 
threshold around which the regimes are defined. γ  is the slope parameter that determines the 
smoothness of the transition between regimes. 
It is possible to assume that nonlinearities in the Taylor rule equation can be described adequately by 
a Logistic or an Exponential Smooth Transition model (LSTR and ESTR respectively)22. 
However, in this paper we define  G(γ,c,st) as a logistic function of first order so that the STR model 
becomes a logistic smooth transition model (LSTR).  
Defining st as the deficit (dt), the LSTR specification implies that the coefficient on deficit would 
take different values depending on whether deficit is below or above the threshold value “c”. This 
would mean that whenever deficit is beyond a particular level, the reaction of the monetary authority 
becomes more aggressive, leading to a larger response of interest rates when the deficit increases. On 
the other hand, when deficit is below the threshold “c”, the monetary authority reaction is milder.  
In the case of the ESTR model, the coefficient changes depending on whether deficit is close or far 
away from the threshold “c”, regardless of whether this difference is positive or negative. In this case 
we would have that the reaction of the monetary authority is equally aggressive for negative or 
positive deviations from the threshold.  
Given the above two specifications, we decide to apply the LSTR methodology because it fits well 
with the idea that a reasonable asymmetric reaction of central bank should take into account the sign 
of the deviation from the threshold value.  Hence, the more the deficit is above the threshold, the 
stronger the central bank reaction should be. On the contrary, the more the deficit is below the 
threshold, the less aggressive the monetary authority reaction should be.  
The equations (6.4.1) and (6.4.2) can be rewritten as a linear regression model with time varying 
coefficients. Hence, rewriting equation (6.4.1)  as 
 
                                                 
22 See Granger and Terasvirta, 1993. 
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t t tr z uδ ′= +                                                                                                                        (6.4.3) 
 
where  
 
( , , )j j j tG c sδ φ θ γ= +                                                                                                         (6.4.4) 
 
Thus, ,j j j jδ φ φ θ ∈ +   and it changes monotonically with the deficit. When  γ = 0 the logistic 
function is equal to 0.5 and the model is linear, when   γ →∞ the LSTR approaches to a threshold 
model with two regimes. 
 
 
Linearity Test 
 
In order to test for linearity it should be tested the hypothesis that γ = 0 in the non-linear model. 
Unfortunately our model is not defined under the null. This problem can be avoided approximating 
the  transition function with  a Taylor-series expansion of the third order around the null hypothesis γ 
= 0, see Tarasvirta (1998). After the approximation, using the deficit as the threshold variable, the 
following auxiliary regression is obtained 
 
3
*
00 01 02 1 2
1
( ) jt t t j t j t t t
j
r d y d y d uα α α α α
=
= + + + + +∑                                                             (6.4.5) 
 
Hence, the linearity test can be carried out with 
 
11 12 21 22 31 32: 0Ho α α α α α α= = = = = =  
 
The results of linearity test on equation for the FED and the ECB are reported in table 5. 
 
Tab. 5  P-VALUES FOR THE LINEARITY TEST. 
  ECB FED 
H0: Linearity Model 0.0260 0.1151 
 
Hence, an important result that can be drawn from this preliminary linearity test is that a linear model 
could be used to describe the FED behaviour while, a nonlinear model, should be the most 
appropriate one for the ECB in the observed period (1999-2006). 
 
 
The LSTR Model Estimation 
 
The LSTR model has been used to estimate the  Taylor rule, as specified in the previous sections. In 
order to do it, the deficit is chosen as the threshold variable. Thus, the LSTR model takes the 
following form 
 
0 1 2 0 1 2( ) ( , , )t t t t t t tr d y d y G c d uφ φ φ θ θ θ γ= + + + + + +                                                         (6.4.6) 
 
and 
 
( ){ } 1( , , ) (1 exp )t tG c d d cγ γ −= + − −                                                                                  (6.4.7) 
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where rt is the interest rate, dt  is the deficit and yt  is the output gap. 
Table 6 shows  that the γ parameter of the FED is close to zero, evidencing a very smooth transition. 
The deficit threshold for a reaction is estimated to be 4.76895. These conclusions are consistent with 
the results found in the linearity test (Table 5). In fact, in table 7 we calculate several levels of G 
corresponding to different levels of deficit. The calculated FED response shows that the reaction is 
extremely smooth since it  ranges from  2.6  to 2.7. 
 
Tab. 6  LSTR MODEL FOR THE FEDERAL RESERVE. 
PARAMETER 0φ  2φ  1θ  Γ C 
      
Estimate 6.0524     5.09716    4.3359    0.01019 4.76895     
Standard error 7.8015     0.82455    0.05213 0.00481 2.73345 
Palue 0.44 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.084 
Sample period 1999-2006  
R2 0.52 
Error Variance^(1/2) = 1.17352 
 
   
Table 7 THE FEDERAL  RESERVE’S RESPONSE TO DEFICIT. 
DEFICIT 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 
         
G(γ,c,dt) 0,499315 0,49957 0,499824 0,500079 0,500334 0,500589 0,500843 0,501098 
Fed 
response 
2,164979 2,166084 2,167188 2,168293 2,169398 2,170502 2,171607 2,172711 
The Federal Reserve’s response:  4.3359*G  
 
 
Tab. 8   LSTR MODEL FOR THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK. 
PARAMETER 0φ  2φ  1θ  Γ C 
      
Estimate 2.29556  0.77323    2.40118 15.2458 3.60975     
Standard error 0.2955   0.19855 0.19853 0.11575 1.04585      
P-value 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005 
Sample period 1999-2006  
R2 0.67  
Error Variance^(1/2)=  1.18688 
 
 
Tab. 9 THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK’S RESPONSE TO DEFICIT.  
DEFICIT 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 
         
G(γ,c,dt) 0,008816 0,039248 0,157994 0,462907 0,798337 0,947872 0,988169 0,9974 
ECB 
response 
0,021168 0,094242 0,379373 1,111522 1,916951 2,276011 2,372771 2,394937 
The European Central Bank’s response: 2.40118 *G  
 
 
Tables 8 and 9 illustrate the results for the ECB using the same methodology.  The γ parameter is 
higher, thus  the transition for the European Central Bank is less smooth around the threshold value. 
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It is worth noting that  a) the threshold for the reaction is 3.60975; b) the ECB  reaction thresholds is  
very close to  the value fixed by the stability pact (3.00); c) these results are consistent with the 
linearity test output presented above (table 5) since the reaction of the ECB shows an asymmetric 
response. Moreover, we can asses that the ECB reaction is more asymmetric than the FED one; and 
d) the ECB reaction increases sharply when the deficit is above the threshold value.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
NKV success in mainstream economics can be, initially ascribed to the climate of progressive 
criticism that, in the early 90’s, regarded expansionary fiscal policies as a tool for achieving full 
employment. Those criticisms founded their rationales in the tide of massive disbelief in Keynesian 
tools, as crowding-out debate, trigger of financial instability due to growing stocks of public debts, 
Ricardian equivalence approach to policy making testify. 
NKV deepened scepticism for fine-tuning target of public deficit as a last addendum to a decade of 
attacks to the Keynesian theory, trying to prove opposite, negative of “pure fiscal policy” on 
equilibrium income. 
The intent to build an alternative point of view was considered so appealing to make them blind on 
the true causes of the success of some isolated experience of expansionary fiscal retrenchments: 
success was due to a policy mix that Keynesian experience, particularly in United States in the early 
80’s, had already widely examined, arguing the advantages of a mix of restrictive fiscal policies and 
easing monetary policies. Therefore,  NKV success is much more the result of “consolidated results” 
of co-operative economic policies rather than an “unconventional wisdom”. 
The intent of our paper was to analytically prove that increase (decrease) in consumption and 
decrease (increase) of inflation expectations cannot result from pure fiscal retrenchments 
(expansions): in a few words, to deny the existence of a “super-Barro” effect and underline the 
crucial role of monetary stance in accompanying fiscal policy. It seems, in our opinion, a too weak 
manifesto for a revolution in the theory and policy making. Nothing new has happened but an over-
stress of “Barro Effect” on consumption. 
European Central bank, much more than Federal Reserve, was immediately prone to accept NKV 
theoretical background De Grauwe (2002), because it seemed a good theoretical underpinning for 
fiscal retrenchments and public sector shrinking. The label these constrained policies as Stability and 
growth Pact is the most evident belief in “Keynesian effects of non-Keynesian fiscal policies”. This 
could help understand why NKV, despite its unequivocal limits, became the new conventional 
wisdom in Europe. It should be wise to day, not only, to see their shortcomings, but be aware that 
“new” policies come from far and their outcomes depend on many surrounding and exogenous 
conditions. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
CBRF is micro-founded through the CB LOSS FUNCTION 
 
Money market equilibrium can be expressed in the following form: 
m ky hR π= − +  
where m is the demand of bank reserves - (M3) expressed in terms of growth rate – which is a positive 
function of income growth ky and inflation π and a negative function of the rate of interest hR . 
The loss function of the Central Bank is obviously linked to the growth rate of money: 
( )L L m=  
Or  
( , , )L L y R π=  
Writing the loss-function in an explicit and very simple form we have: 
( )21
2i i i i
L ky hRπ= + −∑  
The Central Bank looks for the rate of interest  - the instrument – which minimize the loss-function or the 
m rate of growth. Because m depends on y  and π , it is a maximization problem subject to the vinculum:  
( )ei i
e
i i i
y R
sub
y
ρ π
π σ π
 = − −

= +
 
Where the first equation is a IS curve and the second one is a supply curve AS. 
Substituting the IS constraint in the AS one we have: 
(1 ) ei iRπ σρ σρ π= − + +  
Considering - for the sake of simplicity - just one period of time and substituting the vinculum in the loss-
function we have the following Taylor rule: 
2 2 2 2 2 2
(1 ) ( 1) ( )
2 2
e
t t
h k hR y
h h h h
σ σρ σρ σρ
π
σ ρ σρ σ ρ σρ
+ + + +
= +
+ + + +
 
Which is the monetary policy rule curve (MP curve) which allows to find the aggregate demand. In turn the 
aggregate demand curve combined with the AS curve determines the equilibrium income. 
Finally, indicating: 
2 2 2
(1 ) ( 1)
2
h
h h
σ σρ σρβ
σ ρ σρ
+ + +
=
+ +
 
and 
2 2 2
( )
2
k h
h h
σρ
σ ρ σρ
+∂ =
+ +
 
The Taylor rule, then, becomes : 
e
t tR yβπ δ= +  
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Appendix II. 
 
Taxonomy of deficit increase effects 
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APPENDIX III 
Data Description 
 For the estimation of the equations used in this work, the variables considered were23: 
a) Repo rate: it is the central bank interest rates also called official interest rates. It is the main instrument of 
the monetary policy that aims to achieve its primary objective of maintaining price stability. The Federal 
Reserve Discount Rate is the rate at which member banks may borrow short term funds directly from a 
Federal Reserve Bank. The discount rate is one of the two interest rates set by the Fed, the other being the 
Federal funds rate; 
b) Overnight rate: it is  defined as the rate that constitutes the very starting point of the yield curve and is 
normally perceived as being within the control of the central bank, for, it is thus also important to 
understand its dynamics. For the ECB it is called EONIA and it is an average, calculated on a daily basis, 
of the (lending) turnover in the unsecured overnight market of the 49 panel banks.  For the FED the 
federal funds rate (FEDON hereafter) is the interest rate at which depository institutions lend balances 
(federal funds) at the Federal Reserve to other depository institutions overnight. These variables are from 
the European Central Bank and Federal Bank of St. Louis. 
c) Harmonised Consumer Survey (HCS): it is the proxy of inflation expectations  used for Europe. The 
European Commission’s monthly HCS is conducted every month across the European Union as part of 
the joint harmonised EU program of business and consumer surveys. The consumer survey was initiated 
in May 1972, and is now carried out in all 25 current members of the EU. The survey is conducted on 
behalf of the European Commission by various national survey organizations. The sample size in each of 
the fifteen countries that were members of the EU prior to the most recent expansion ranges between 
1,000 and 3,300 consumers. The survey asks a standard set of questions in all countries, and the results are 
reported each month by the European Commission, and used as inputs to the monthly economic and 
consumer sentiment indexes (M. A. Wynne, 2005).  The proxy of the inflation expectations  used for 
United States is the MCSI, conducted by the University of Michigan, which is a valuable guide to changes 
in consumer attitudes that may influence spending behaviour. The preliminary data is released on the tenth 
(except on weekends) of each month. A final report for the prior month is released on the first of the 
month. 
d) Industrial production: due to the need of using monthly observation, it is taken as proxy of GDP. The 
Index of Industrial Production shows the movement of the volume of output of the Industrial Sector. It is 
one of the most important industrial short-term indicators which aim at measuring, on a monthly basis, the 
ups and downs of the volume of industrial output with a special focus on detecting, as early as possible, 
the turning points of the business cycle. This enables planners, decision makers and the business 
community at large to be aware of any sign of change in the progress of the economy in order to take 
appropriate and timely policy measures. Both indexes are from the IMF- Financial statistics.  
a) Output gap (yt): it is the percentage deviation of monthly industrial production from the long run trend 
computed with the Hodrick-Prescott filter; 
b) The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to calculate effective inflation (πt), that is πt  is equal to 
100*[ln(CPIt/CPIt-12)];   
c) US Deficit: it is general government deficit (-) or surplus (+), expressed as percentage points, 
series(t)/GDP(t). The EU Deficit is defined similarly as Euro area 12 (fixed composition), General 
government Deficit (change in aggregated debt), expressed as percentage points, series(t)/GDP(t); 
d) Finally, the variable DM3  is  the contribution to the M3 annual growth rate by central governments24 
borrowing to Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFIs).  “The relationship between MFI credit to 
general government and M3 can be illustrated in the context of the consolidated MFI balance sheet. An 
increase in the credit extended to general government by MFIs (either in the form of loans or as purchases 
of government debt securities) will expand the asset side of the MFI balance sheet. All other things being 
equal, the accounting identity underlying the balance sheet implies that either another item on the asset 
                                                 
23 Data source: IMF - Financial Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank, European Central Bank, University of Michigan and 
European Commissiom. 
24 Balance Sheet Items; Frequency: Monthly; Reference area: Euro area (changing composition); Adjustment indicator: Working day 
and seasonally adjusted; BS reference sector breakdown: Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFIs); type: Contribution to the 
annual growth rate of M3; Counterpart area: Euro area (changing composition); BS counterpart sector: Central Government deficit. 
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side must shrink or the liabilities side of the MFI balance sheet must also expand, for instance, through an 
increase in M3 (which represents the largest component of MFI liabilities)”25. 
 
                                                 
25 ECB Monthly Bulletin, April 2004, page 45. 
